War of 1812 Bicentennial

Canada and Canadian Defence: Chapter 4

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Chapter IV

Campaigns of 1812–13, and what they teach—American plan of campaign, 1812—Opening events—British capture Fort Detroit and Mackinac—Battle of Queenston Heights—La Colle—British military policy—Campaign of 1813—Americans capture York, Fort George, Fort Erie, and march on Burlington Heights—Stony Creek—British regain ascendancy on Lake Ontario—Americans fall back—Situation on the lakes—Sackett's Harbour—Position on the Niagara frontier—Anxiety as to pending naval battles—Reinforcements and supplies fail Barclay on Lake Erie—British feet on that lake—Retreat of Proctor—Moravian town—Roosevelt on the opposing fleets—Americans burn Niagara—British take Fort Niagara and destroy various villages—Operations towards Lake Champlain—Chateauguay—Chrystler's Farm—Situation at close of 1813—Remarks on the operations.

We now turn to what the campaigns of 1812 and 1813 teach us.

The American plan of campaign for 1812 was with one force of about 3,000, under General Hull, to invade Western Canada, from the State of Michigan, near Detroit, and seize Amherstburg, another to occupy the Niagara frontier; and with a third to move against Montreal, in order to cut off Upper Canada from Lower Canada and the sea.

The force under General Hull, which was the first to advance and cross the Canadian frontier, met with serious resistance from the troops near Amherstburg, under Colonel Proctor,1, and, disappointed in receiving no welcome from the inhabitants, withdrew again to Fort Detroit.

Brock in the meantime, having control of Lakes Ontario and Erie, and therefore being able to move his men by water across them, had been approaching with a small force from York to oppose him, and on August 16, by a daring passage of the Detroit River, succeeded in compelling Hull to capitulate at Fort Detroit. Here about 2,500 men, 33 guns, 2,000 stand of arms, and a brig-of-war were surrendered to Brock, and the Michigan territory passed under British control.

In addition to advancing against Fort Detroit, Brock had also, upon his own responsibility, ordered the officer commanding at St. Joseph's, north of Lake Huron, to sail for Mackinac and endeavour to seize that post. This was successfully carried out, and the passage between Lake Michigan and Lake Huron was thus secured.2

Then, crossing Lake Erie, he established posts along the Niagara frontier, and strengthened Fort George with heavy guns from Fort Detroit.

On October 12, 1812, an attack upon the Niagara frontier was made by General van Rensellaar, with about 4,000 men, a body of whom, effecting a passage of the river in boats, succeeded in gaining the heights of Queenston; but in the battle which ensued they were attacked by reinforcements under General (afterwards Sir Roger) Sheaffe, brought up from Fort George and elsewhere, and defeated with severe loss. General Wadsworth, Colonel Scott (afterwards for many years Commander-in-Chief of the American Army) and several hundred prisoners were taken, many of the assailants being driven over the cliffs into the river below.

Brock, with his Aide-de-camp, Colonel Macdonell, had been killed early in the day, "having died to preserve what Wolfe died to conquer";1 but these fresh victories of the war gave breathing-time to Canada.

The advance of the American force upon Montreal was but weakly pushed, and was driven back near La Colle,2, north of Lake Champlain.

Possibly these successes produced overconfidence, for although, in December, 1812, about 30 seamen and 120 shipwrights had arrived in the Upper Province, having been engaged at Quebec, and shipbuilding was then carried on at Kingston, York, and Amherstburg, the Americans built far more strenuously at Sackett's Harbour.

Brock had before his death been anxious that that post should be attacked, with a view to the destruction of the buildings and plant there; but the enterprise was not approved of, and Sackett's Harbour was left unmolested. On the American side, however, the Secretary of War, General Armstrong, had clearly recognized the importance of that post and of naval ascendancy on the lakes; for before the war broke out he had written thus: "Resting, as the line of Canadian defence does in its whole extent, on navigable lakes and rivers, no time should be lost in getting a naval ascendancy on both; for cetaris paribus, the belligerent who is first to obtain this advantage will (miracles excepted) win the game." Brock had also desired to attack Fort Niagara, although this he was less anxious for, as the work was commanded by Fort George, and could therefore, he considered, be taken whenever necessary.

Unfortunately, it was at this time the policy of Great Britain to avoid every enterprise of an active—i.e., offensive—character, as the Government still clung to the hope that, the Orders in Council having been repealed, peace would be soon arranged, and this policy was pressed upon Sir George Prevost in Canada, who urged it upon his subordinates.

It was a natural policy, and from the highest point of view a right policy in intention, but it failed in its chief object (peace), and in its effect became injurious to the interests of Canada. Preparations for war were, in consequence of it, carried on after Brock's death in but a half-hearted manner; and no naval officers, mechanicians, or seamen were promptly sent out to Canada to organize and strengthen the naval flotillas on the lakes. Too much reliance was placed upon a peace being arranged, and this had its reflex in a lesser degree—and unfortunately so—in Canada. War had commenced, and that being so, no cessation in the preparations for continuing the contest should have taken place, and no measure being vitally upon the control of the lakes deferred.

Making full allowance for all the difficulties—and they were many—surrounding the Home and Canadian Governments, the criticism of historians seems justified—viz., that supineness at this period characterized and condemned the operations of the British; and that the importance of maintaining ascendancy on the water, if theoretically admitted, was not at heart, or thoroughly, understood.

Campaign of 1813.

During the winter of 1812 the American naval commander, Commodore Chauncey, had organized at Sackett's Harbour a flotilla, which came out upon the lake in April, 1813, in strength superior to the British flotilla, which then took refuge in Kingston, and Lake Ontario passed under American control.

The American plan of campaign for this year much resembled that for the year before.

One Western force, between 7,000 and 8,000 strong, under General Harrison, assembling at Sandusky on Lake Erie, was to reoccupy the Michigan territory, endeavour to retake Detroit, and capture Amherstburg.

A second, about 10,000, under General Dearborn, from Sackett's Harbour, with a force from Buffalo and the fleet on Lake Ontario co-operating, was to take York, Kingston, Fort George, and Fort Erie.

A third, under General Wade Hampton, was to move from the east of Lake Champlain against Montreal, in concert with the second, which it was anticipated would very soon be able to combine with it in that enterprise.

In the end it was resolved not to attack Kingston, but to feint against it only, while moving against Montreal.

The events of this year opened a gallant British enterprise against Ogdensburg, above Montreal, on the American side of the St. Lawrence, carried out by Major George Macdonell (afterwards distinguished also at Chateauguay), with a small force as a reprisal for raids on the Canadian shore.

The St. Lawrence was frozen hard, and, crossing on the ice with field artillery, Macdonell succeeded in taking a battery, capturing some guns, and destroying three or four vessels with a quantity of stores.1

Next, a joint American naval and military expedition, under Commodore Chauncey and General Dearborn, sailing for York, took that town,2 then the capital of Upper Canada, on April 27, 1813. The small defending force made a most creditable resistance, and heavy loss was caused to the American by the explosion of a magazine; but the defence was totally inadequate in strength to protect the place; the public and some private buildings were burnt, a vessel on the stocks was lost to the British, and General Sheaffe, in command, fell back with the small regular garrison to Kingston.

The expedition next sailed for the western end of Lake Ontario, and after some fighting on May 26 and 27, effected a landing to the west of Fort George, the British troops, under General Vincent, having, in face of this superior force, been compelled to abandon Forts George and Erie, and fall back towards the position of Burlington Heights, near Hamilton. The enemy followed, overrunning the Niagara district near the lake, and there was now the danger that the force in the west, near Amherstburg, would be cut off from York and Kingston.

Thus very grave results had quickly followed upon the loss of British naval control over Lake Ontario.

But, happily for Canada at this crisis, which was an important one in the war, a sudden change took place in the fortunes of the contest, and the tables were reversed, largely owing to the recovery of that lost control of the water.

To explain this we must mention that as the American troops were nearing Burlington Heights, a most successful night attack was planned and carried out against them by Colonel Harvey, of General Vincent's force,1 near Stony Creek2 on June 6, 1813, in which two Generals of Brigade, Chandler and Winder, and nearly 200 officers and men, with some guns and twelve batteaux laden with baggage, fell into the British hands.

The British were not strong enough to follow up the pursuit, in the face of the American supports; but the following day their flotilla on Lake Ontario appeared off the shore, and bombarded the American camp. The enemy, then perceiving that they had no longer command of the lake on their flank, and discouraged by their reverse at Stony Creek, retreated towards Fort George.

This sudden change in the ascendancy on Lake Ontario had arisen in this way.

In May, 1813—and it is a point to be borne in mind that this was eleven months, or nearly a year, after the declaration of war—Sir James Yeo, of the Royal Navy, with 450 officers and seamen, had arrived at Kingston from England to take charge, as Commodore, of the naval defence of the lakes. In June, 1813, also (a full year after hostilities had opened), Captain Barclay, R.N.,1 with about twenty-five seamen, had reached Amherstburg to supervise and command on Lake Erie.

Sir James Yeo, on his arrival at Kingston, infused great energy into the shipbuilding and naval organization going on there, with the result that while the American flotilla was near Fort George, he issued on Lake Ontario with a British one able to dispute the supremacy of its waters with Chauncey. On May 27, while the Americans were landing at Fort George, a British joint naval and military expedition sailed across the lake from Kingston for Sackett's Harbour to reconnoitre, and if possible take, that post, but the attempt was not pushed with determination, and after some fighting, and the half-destruction of a vessel on the stocks, was in the end abandoned.

What might have been comparatively easy months, or even weeks, before was not so now.1 Subsequently to that, Yeo proceeded to the west end of the lake, arriving, as we have said, on June 8, after the attack on Stony Creek, and bringing reinforcements of men, equipment, and stores for the British troops.

After the Americans had retired upon Fort George, much desultory fighting went on upon the Niagara frontier throughout the summer and autumn of 1813 in the "Beechwoods" and elsewhere upon Canadian territory. The incidents which took place, illustrative of wood-fighting and minor warfare, are interesting, but cannot be detailed here. Colonel FitzGibbon distinguished himself at the Beaver Dams, and Laura Secord, wife of a loyalist, to whom a monument has been put up on the spot in recent years, earned for herself a place in Canadian history. The enemy did not renew the attempt to advance northwards to Burlington Heights.

With regard to Lake Erie, Captain Barclay, on reaching that lake, found no adequate supplies there of any kind; and by that time Captain Perry, of the American Navy, a most energetic officer, had made considerable progress in getting together a flotilla at Presqu'ile, which, however, so long as Barclay's vessels could blockade the port, was unable to come over the bar into deep water in face of his guns.1

But the naval assistance sent from England had not arrived in time to be of the service it would have been earlier in the war in securing and maintaining superiority upon the waters of Lakes Ontario and Erie; and henceforth the words "Too late" are for Great Britain written large upon the naval operations of this war. What men could do the naval officers and those under them did, but they, as well as British and Canadian interests, were sacrificed to earlier procrastination.

It is useful to note how, at this period of the war, the control of the water affected the operations on land. On Lake Ontario, Yeo, although able to keep the lake, was in no preponderating strength. So evenly matched were his and Chauncey's squadrons, and so much hung upon the issue of a naval battle which would decide ascendancy upon that lake, that neither naval commander ventured to engage at what seemed a disadvantage. Throughout part of June, July, and August, the one watched the other, both manœvring occasionally to bring on a battle which each believed his opponent was anxious to avoid; and in the meantime, as this decisive engagement might be fought at any moment, the ships could not be used, as they otherwise would have been, in convoying vessels with stores, or carrying reinforcements by water, either to Captain Barclay on Lake Erie, or to the land forces on the Niagara frontier and in the west.

In consequence, the land communications being, as we have said, extremely indifferent, this detrimentally affected the British operations throughout the theatre of war.

The despatches and letters contained in Cruikshank's Documentary History of the War enable one to picture clearly the state of expectation prevailing at this period in Canada with both armies while this anticipated naval battle on Lake Ontario was pending.

The land forces, and also Captain Barclay on Lake Erie, were pressing Yeo to assist them, but he felt unable to comply; Barclay had long been anxious to attack Presqu'ile with a joint naval and military force, but could neither get men, equipment, nor supplies sufficient for that object; Proctor, in command at Amherstburg, was appealing in vain to General De Rottenburg on the Niagara frontier for support; the American General Brown (opposed to De Rottenburg on that frontier) was imploring Chauncey to co-operate with him, who refused; and the American General Harrison, in the west, was delaying his advance upon Detroit until Perry had secured control of Lake Erie. He had collected his force at Sandusky, had suffered a partial reverse on the River Miami (or Maumee), in an engagement with Proctor's troops, who had attacked him there; and had gained also a partial success; but his instructions from the Secretary of War were to defer further operations until his communications would be safe, through Perry having obtained ascendancy on the lake.

All thoughts were now turned towards the naval situation on Lakes Ontario and Erie, and in the meantime the British land forces on the Niagara frontier and in the west, as well as Captain Barclay's flotilla, were falling into great distress for want of equipment and of food.

Captain Fulton, Aide-de-camp to Sir G. Prevost, writes, on June 18, 1813, that the 49th Regiment on the Niagara frontier were "literally naked."

And General De Rottenburg, on July 14, that the 41st Regiment was "in rags, and without shoes."

Captain Barclay, on Lake Erie, was an especial sufferer, because, in addition to the interruption at this period of the communications by water, Sir G. Prevost writes to Lord Bathurst on July 20: "The ordnance, ammunition, and other stores for the service of Lake Erie had been deposited at York (Toronto), but unfortunately were either destroyed or fell into the enemy's hands."

The extracts from correspondence which we give below show with what great anxiety the issue of the expected naval struggle for ascendancy was regarded.

Colonel Harvey, the hero of Stony Creek, writes on June 11, 1813: "Our position, so long as our fleet on Lake Ontario is triumphant, is a secure one. Should any disaster—which God forbid!—befall that, we have no longer any business here, or in this part of Canada."

On July 1, General de Rottenburg declines to reinforce Gen. Proctor, for operations against Presqu'ile, both because his men were without supplies and unfit to march, and also because, in the event of a naval disaster on Lake Ontario, he would (he wrote be under the necessity of "retreating to Kingston to strengthen that point"; and he adds that Proctor, in that event, should he be cut off and unable to join him (De Rottenburg) at Burlington Heights, must retire on Lake Huron.

Captain Barclay writes on July 16 to Sir George Prevost; "The whole line under General Proctor (about Amherstburg) must lay open to the enemy in the event of their being able to make His Majesty's squadron [on Lake Erie] retire."

And Sir J. Yeo to Lord Bathurst from Kingston on the same date: "Every military operation, or success, depends entirely on whoever can maintain the naval superiority on this lake [Ontario]."

Thus it is evident that not only the naval commanders, who might, perhaps have been viewed by some as influenced by professional feeling, but the military equally with them, regarded naval ascendancy on both Lakes Ontario and Erie as of extreme, indeed almost vital, consequence to the success of the defence.

At last Captain Barclay felt it necessary to relax the blockade of Presqu'ile on Lake Erie, in order to sail to Long Point on that lake, and there meet some expected supplies (which did not, however, arrive at the time anticipated). Perry at once took advantage of his absence to cross the bar, place guns on board his largest vessel, and come out with his flotilla upon the lake. When Barclay, therefore, sailed back to renew the blockade, he was obliged instead to take refuge from the stronger American squadron in the port of Amherstburg.

His position now was worse than before, because no supplies could reach him safely over the waters of the lake, even from Long Point; but he worked strenuously to complete the Detroit, his flagship, just launched, placing on board of her some guns from the land forts, and at last, feeling (to use the words of Sir George Prevost, "compelled from circumstances of impervious necessity to seek the superior forces of the enemy," he sailed out to bring Perry to battle. He had six vessels mounting sixty-three guns, to Perry's nine mounting fifty-four only, but the latter's guns were of far superior power. At this time not a day's flour was in store for his men, who were on half-allowance, and his equipment was in several respects infamously bad.1 His crew numbered among them over 200 soldiers, chiefly obtained from Proctor, 85 Canadian-lake men, and only 50 seamen, some of whom had come up but three days before.

In the battle which ensued (September 10, 1813) the American flagship was obliged, early in the action, to strike her flag, Perry removing to another vessel, and victory then hung in the balance, but in the end the American squadron, skilfully commanded by Perry, was triumphant, and the British flotilla was practically destroyed, Captain Barclay being severely wounded,1 and most of his superior officers placed hors de combat. The British loss was about 135, the American 123.

Mr. Roosevelt writes2 as follows most generously as to Barclay, Perry's opponent in this action:

"Captain Barclay handled his ships like a first-rate seaman. It was impossible to arrange them so as to be superior to his antagonist, for the latter's force was of such a nature that in smooth water his gunboats gave him a great advantage, while in any sea his two brigs were more than a match for the whole British squadron. In short, our victory was due to our heavy metal."

And also in another passage:

"The chief fault to be found in the American accounts is that they sedulously conceal the comparative weight of metal, while carefully specifying the number of guns. The superiority of the Americans in long-gun metal was nearly as three to two, and in carronade metal greater than two to one."

Roosevelt describes the opposing squadrons thus:

Broadside.
American..................936pounds.
British..................459 "
Crews.
American.....................532
British.....................440

After this battle, the Americans being now supreme on Lake Erie, General Harrison advanced from Sandusky, and the dispirited and disheartened troops under Proctor (whose nervous system had now, apparently, broken down, unfitting him for such a command) retreated before him from Amherstburg along the River Thames. During this retirement, which was very indifferently conducted, discipline became relaxed, and in an action near Moravian-Town (October 5) the British force was defeated and dispersed, Tecumseh, a brave Indian chief, being killed. Proctor's scattered troops afterwards gained Burlington Heights, concentrating there with another British column.

Harrison did not advance further, but returned towards Amherstburg, and later on in the war proceeded to the Niagara frontier.

The decisive naval battle expected on Lake Ontario never took place. After Barclay's defeat on Lake Erie there were some indecisive engagements on the former lake between portions of Yeo's and Chauncey's squadrons, with varying results; and, eventually, the American flotilla becoming rather the stronger. Yeo, who must naturally have felt more than ever the importance of preserving his squadron from unnecessary loss, remained mainly within Kingston harbour, over which Chauncey kept up a blockade not, however, entirely effective.

Roosevelt,1 summing up the relative operations of Yeo and Chauncey in this year (1813), considers that on Lake Ontario the Americans were dominant from April 19 to June 3, and the British superior from that date to July 21.

From this to September 28 the fleets were contending for the supremacy, and from September 28 to the end of the operations the Americans had control. It is also estimated that Chauncey's (the American) fleet was able to co-operate with the American land forces (a very important matter) for over twice the length of time that Yeo's was able to aid the British land forces (i.e. for 107 days as compared to 48).

On the Niagara frontier the Americans, as the season for active operations drew towards a close, did little but raid the Canadian border, and, on December 10, burning the small town of Niagara, retired to their own bank of that river. This burning of Niagara and turning the inhabitants out off their houses when snow was on the ground was done upon the official pretext that "the frontier (American) must be protected by destroy such Canadian villages in its front as would best shelter the enemy in winter," and it is only necessary to allude to it here because this action with respect to an undefended town, together with the burning of buildings at York, and of houses, farms, etc., on the border, caused an extremely bitter feeling throughout Canada, and led to subsequent retaliatory measures on the part of the British both on the American bank of the Niagara River, and elsewhere on the theatre of war outside Canada, such as on the Delaware and at Washington.

Towards the middle of December, 1813, General Sir Gordon Drummond, an officer of much determination and enterprise, assumed command on the Niagara frontier, and, crossing the river, took the American post of Fort Niagara by storm (December 19), which remained from that time to the close of the war (in December, 1814) in British occupation. Afterwards, moving thence along the northern bank of the Niagara, he burnt or destroyed Lewiston, Black Rock, Buffalo, with much of the shipping there, and Fort Schlosser.1 In the direction of Lake Champlain also the British had succeeded, towards the close of July and early in August, in destroying a quantity of stores at Plattsburg and some of the enemy's smaller vessels on the lake.

The American land forces which were to have advanced towards Kingston and Montreal were not successful. They had waited for the co-operation of the more western column, which they did not receive; and, owing to the friction between their two chief leaders, Generals Hampton and Wilkinson, and their mutual jealousy of the Secretary of War, they moved without concert and slowly. Hampton, in an attack upon a British force, was defeated at Chateauguay by Colonel de Salaberry (October 26, 1813), and a division of Wilkinson's, passing down the St. Lawrence below Kingston, was followed and attacked by armed vessels from that post,2 as well as by troops on land under Colonel Morrison, and defeated near Chrystler's Farm1 on the north bank of the river (November 11, 1813). As the result of this, no attempt was made upon Montreal, and the enemy evacuated Canadian territory in this quarter entirely.

At the close of the campaign, Amherstburg, in Western Canada, remained in American hands; and Fort Niagara, on United States territory, as also the post of Mackinac, in those of the British; but the attempt to permanently occupy any portion of Canada, except about the Amherstburg border, had failed in 1813 as in 1812.

Remarks upon the Campaigns of 1812 and 1813.

On considering the campaigns we have above touched upon one can see that the want of energetic measures and preparation for war in the winter of 1812 lost the British the command of Lake Ontario in April, 1813. Then followed the burning of York the loss of Forts George and Erie, and the retreat from the Niagara frontier; but at this juncture the temporary recovery of ascendancy on the lake by Commodore Sir J. Yeo, with the night attack at Stony Creek, were followed by the retreat of the Americans. Further, the British ascendancy on Lake Ontario not being supreme, and the land communications very bad, led to the misfortunes of Captain Barclay and the naval defeat on Lake Erie, which at once entailed the retirement of Proctor from the west, and of De Rottenburg from the Niagara frontier, to prevent being cut off from Kingston.

The importance of the control of the lakes could scarcely have been more strikingly brought out than by these events.

The most general criticism made against the American operations is that for the sake of distracting the defence, they invaded, or attempted to invade, the frontier at too many points, with too many columns; and that it would probably have been better to have massed against Kingston or Montreal.

We close the account of what occurred in 1812–1813 with the following comments by President Roosevelt, Captain Mahan, General Sir James Carmichael Smyth, and General Armstrong (Secretary of War of the United States during the war), which are of great interest.

The former writes,1 referring to the want of assistance afforded to Captain Barclay on Lake Erie:

"It is a matter of wonder that the British and Canadian Governments could have been so supine as to permit their existing force to go badly armed, and so unenterprising as to build but one additional ship (i.e. at Amherstburg) when they could easily have preserved their superiority."

And Captain Mahan thus alludes to the inadequate British efforts made to maintain that naval ascendancy on the lakes with which the war had opened, as well as to the importance of that ascendancy, and also to the American plan of operations and its defects:

"The difficulties of obtaining supplies, mechanics, and seaman in that then remote region imposed great hindrances upon the general British preparations. There nevertheless remained in their hands at the opening of the campaign of 1813 the great advantage over the Americans, first of the separation of the latter's divisions, enforced by the British holding the bank of the Niagara; and, secondly, of the almost insuperable difficulty of crossing the Erie bar1 unarmed, if the enemy's fleet kept in position near it. That the British failed to sustain their original advantages condemns their management."

"No substantial reinforcements reached Canada until long after the ice broke up,2 and then in insufficient numbers. British naval preparations had been on an inadequate scale, receiving no proper professional supervision. The American Government, on the contrary, had had the whole winter to prepare, and the services of a very competent naval organizer. . . . The British frontier which the United States was to assail extended from Montreal on the east to Detroit on the west. Its three parts were: Montreal and the St. Lawrence on the east, or left, flank; Ontario in the middle, centring at Kingston; and Erie on the right. . . . Canada depended wholly upon the sea, and it touched the sea at Montreal. The United States, with its combined naval and military strength (crude as the latter was), was at the beginning of 1813 quite able in material power to grapple two out of three parts—Montreal and Kingston. Had they been gained, Lake Erie would have fallen, as is demonstrated by the fact that the whole Erie region went down like a house of cards the moment Perry triumphed on the lake."1

". . . The destruction of the British naval force [on Lake Erie] decided the campaign in the north-west, by transferring control of the water. Its general military results were in this respect final. Nothing occurred to modify them during the rest of the war. Detroit and the Michigan Territory fell back into the hands of the United States."

". . . From Lake Superior to the head of the first rapid of the St. Lawrence, the control of the water was the decisive factor in the general military situation. . . . Immediately below the last lay Montreal, accessible to sea-going vessels from the ocean—to that point, therefore, the sea-power of Great Britain reached, and there it ended."

"Mackinac, Detroit, Kingston, and Montreal, these four places, together with an adequate development of naval strength on the lakes, constituted the essential elements of the military situation at the opening of hostilities. Why? Mackinac and Detroit, because being situated upon extremely narrow parts of the vital chain of water communication, their possession controlled definitely all transit. Upon Kingston and Montreal, bing their position and intrinsic advantages, rested the communication of all Canada along and above the St. Lawrence with the Sea-power of Great Britain. . . .

"When the boundary on Lake Champlain was reached (by the United States Armies), Montreal was but forty miles distant."

Sir James Carmichael Smyth, who, after the close of the war (1825), was sent to Canada by the Duke of Wellington to report upon Canadian defence, considers1 that as soon as the American flotilla had become supreme on Lake Ontario,2 a concentrated attack should have been made upon Kingston, the British naval post on that lake.

Finally, General Armstrong, referring to the capture of Forts George and Erie in 1813, and the advance towards Burlington Heights, says:3

"It only wounded the tail of the Lion—Kingston or a point below it seized, all above perishes because the tree is girdled."

The above criticisms must necessarily carry great weight; and this may be added to them, that if the execution of the American plans had devolved upon experienced leaders of trained troops, acting in close concert under one command, whatever may have been the intrinsic defects of the plans themselves, a larger measure of success would, humanly speaking, have attended them.

In no future war can it be anticipated that the errors of this war will be repeated by any enemy.

Further remarks upon the above campaigns are deferred to the conclusion of the entire story of the war.

1 Colonel Proctor distinguished himself at this period of the war (early in 1813), and was promoted Brigadier-General.

2 The importance which Brock attached to the possession of Fort Detroit and Mackinac strikingly evinces the correctness of his military judgment. As to their strategic view, see pp. 69, 72, and 82.

1 Battle of Queenston Heights, by Ernest Cruikshank (1890). Brock's monument on Queenston Heights marks the scene of this battle. Some colours captured at Fort Detroit and Queenston Heights now hang in the chapel and hall of the Royal Hospital at Chelsea.

2 Sometimes spelt Lacolle.

1 This affords one illustration of how the water frontier of Canada to the south becomes, at certain points and times in a military and defence sense, a land one (see Chapter II).

2 Now Toronto, the capital of the province of Ontario.

1 Afterwards General Sir John Harvey, Governor of Nova Scotia, a distinguished officer who served subsequently at Waterloo.

2 It is interesting to note that last year (1909) the Countess Grey, wife of Earl Grey, Governor-General of Canada, unveiled a monument at Stony Creek to the soldiers who fell in this attack.

1 An officer of distinction, who had lost an arm at Trafalgar.

1 The post of Sackett's Harbour had been left almost entirely defenceless up to March, 1813, but now had been strengthened (see Mahan, Sea-Power in Relation to the War of 1812, vol. ii, p. 681).

1 See p. 44. The most powerful of his ships could not do so with her guns on board.

1 For instance, the Detroit's port-holes had to be hastily and clumsily fitted to receive the shore guns, for which they had not originally been intended; and throughout the subsequent action the gunners, being without matches or tubes fit for use, had to fire pistols at the priming to set the guns off. (From the Proceedings of the Court Martial upon Captain Barclay, who was honourably acquitted for a loss of his squadron.)

1 Losing the use of his remaining arm.

2 Naval War of 1812, pp. 273 and 261.

1 Naval War of 1812, p. 251.

1 See enlarged plan of the Niagara district on the map facing the concluding page.

2 This shows that the blockade of Kingston by Chauncey was not, at all events at this moment, thoroughly effective.

1 Occasionally spelt "Crystler's Farm," but as above on the clasp to the Peninsular medal.

1 Naval War of 1812, p. 143.

2 Sea-Power in its Relations to the War of 1812, vol. i., pp. 377, 378, 302–305; also vol. ii., pp. 123–125.

1 At Presqu'ile.

2 I.e., till the late spring or early summer of 1813, the war having broken out in June, 1812.

1 In the victory over Barclay's squadron.

1 Précis of the Wars of Canada, by Sir J. Carmichael Smyth.

2 Which it was when the campaign of 1813 opened, and York (Toronto) was burnt.

3 Cruikshank's Documentary History of the War—Campaign on the Niagara Frontier, 1813, part iii., p. 146.